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Since 1990s many countries have moved toward greater central 
bank independence (CBI) by either amending their Central Bank’s laws 
or writing them de novo. Also countries of Western Balkans and many 
other transition countries have moved toward greater CBI. There are 
many potential benefits associated with greater CBI, and one of them is 
stable growth of money and liquidity. For a given level of money market 
development the hypothesis is that a more independent CB is likely to 
promote more stable growth of money supply (Dželetović et al., 2008). 
As a result the main research task of this work is to estimate the effects of 
CBI on money market growth for five Western Balkans countries and 
five other European transition countries. Because the empirical studies 
were very limited for the relationship between CBI and money market 
growth, there were no clear conclusions. In addition, there were different 
measuring methodologies that attempt to quantify the extent of legal and 
actual CBI. Related to the main research task, this dissertation has 
examined the effects of CBI on money market stability (proxied by bank 
deposit growth) for a sample of 10 countries for a period from 1999-2009 
by using fixed effect model. Through this methodology different 
regressions have been estimated, but the results were not robust and 
there are no clear finding on the relationship between CBI and money 
market growth. 
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1. Introduction 
The Western Balkans comprises of relatively small-sized economies. 
Monetary stability and sovereignty in these counties has increased since 1990s 
which has positively contributed to macroeconomic performance. It has been 
argued that a main contributors were the central banks, which by conducting 
monetary policies have managed to ensure price stability by controlling money 
supply (keeping a low inflation rate without creating a high unemployment 
rate), which then affected the economic growth, employment, balance of 
payment, etc. The central banks of the countries in Western Balkans were 
established after the 1990s but faced several difficulties during this process. 
According to Belke and Zenkić (2007, p.17), some of the difficulties were lack of 
experience in using their powers and instruments and so the implementation of 
policy objective was not effective.  The authors added that the environment in 
which they were operating, the lack of track record1 and the lack of credibility2 
made the process of their formation even harder. The environment was 
characterized with weak tax systems and fiscal controls, weak banking systems, 
weak market discipline and weak legal systems (Belke and Zenkić, 2007, p.17). 
Now, the financial system has improved but there is still need of time to 
achieve the full compatibility of practices and standards with that of the 
European Central Bank.  Monetary Policy continues to remain prudent, with 
the objective of having stable prices and exchange rates (EC-European 
Economy, 2006). However, due to a high degree of euroisation the extent of 
fully use of independent monetary policy is limited (Kosovo and Montenegro 
have euro as legal tender while majority of other states have pegged their 
currencies to the Euro) (EC-European Economy, 2006) 
The financial system in Western Balkan is composed 90% from the banking 
sectors, while the other sectors such as non-banking sector and capital market 
play only a marginal role (Müller-Jentsch, 2007). The money market (MM) as a 
segment of financial market, which is characterized as “the heart of any 
national financial system” (Galac, Ivičić and Dumičić, 2007), is little developed 
or not developed at all. Kosovo does not have money market (CBK Report -
Vision of the Future of the National payments, 2009) while in BiH it is 
underdeveloped. In Montenegro, the MM is in its early stages of its 
development and is characterized with a small number of participants and low 
volumes of trading (Vukajlović-Grba, 2007, p.326). The same situation is also in 
Macedonia (Atanasova et al., 2008) in terms of instruments and volume.  
                                               
1 “the central banks of the SEECs lacked a track record that might help establish public 
confidence in the credibility of their policies” (Belke and Zenkić, 2007, p.17) 
2 “the lack of CB credibility, results in a slower adjustment of public expectations of inflation, 
with the result that real interest rates rise or remain high longer” (Belke and Zenkić, 2007, p.17) 
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The development of the MM in Albania has experienced growth in its 
volume and instruments used. However, because it still falls behind from the 
MM of developed countries the Bank of Albania remains committed in 
developing it more (Bank of Albania Development Plan 06-08, p.15). Serbia and 
Croatia are more experienced in MM as they establish them in the 1990s, but it 
was not until the mid 2000s when these markets became more developed and 
more up to date, however it still is in its early stages of development and needs 
more improvements (Mu and Horgan, 2006). The money market in the Western 
Balkans still fall behind from that of the developed one but it is very important 
to keep them improve because they help maintain stability of money and 
liquidity, and hence, regulate the economic spectrum and encourage economic 
development (Galac,  Ivičić and Dumičić, 2007).  Because it plays a significant 
role in the process of conducting the monetary policy by the central bank, in 
this thesis we would like to estimate what are the effects of Central Bank 
Independence on money market stability. 
 
2. The rationale for more Independent Central Banks and an overview of 
empirical literature  
The theoretical aspects of the relationship between CBI and inflation have 
been much explored. However, because majority of Western Balkan countries 
have chosen more or less a fixed exchange rate system with the euro as the 
anchor currency or with euro as sole legal tender, they have limited control 
over their monetary policy. As such the relationship between CBI and inflation 
will not be empirically tested for countries in our sample (this relationship will 
be only theoretically mentioned).  On the other hand, because one of the 
potential benefits arrived from autonomous CBs is stable money growth, the 
relationship that will be investigated in this thesis is between CBI and money 
market growth (proxied by bank deposit growth).   
Central Bank Independence (CBI) has been part of many discussions and 
papers starting from 1980s, but it was not until the mid 1990s when this topic 
reached its highest prominence due to the work of Cukierman and of many 
other authors. Since then many countries have moved toward greater CBI by 
either amending their CB’s laws or writing them de novo. This trend was not 
only seen in industrialized countries but also in developing and transition 
countries. One of the main reasons towards the greater CBI was the problem 
known as “time inconstancy”, firstly introduced by seminal papers of Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).  According to the authors, 
discretionary monetary policies would create incentives to expand the economy 
and reduce unemployment through monetary expansion. In the long run this 
discretionary monetary policy would lead only to higher inflation because the 
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economy cannot exceed its potential GDP or its natural rate of unemployment 
(Crowe and Meade, 2007). This is known as “inflationary bias”. This happens 
because the government wants to be re-elected and is willing to sacrifice long-
term welfare for short term political gains (Eijffinger, Van Rooij, and Schaling, 
1996). One of the solutions to this problem, suggested by Rogoff (1985), is to 
delegate monetary policy to an institution that is inflation averse and has 
credibility to maintain this low inflation, e.g.  independent central banks. 
Another solution suggested by Walsh (1995) is to give greater incentive to 
central bank’s management to pursue low inflation by establishment a system 
of penalties if the price stability goal is not achieved. This is known as 
contracting approach, where the contract is signed between principal 
(government) and agent (central bank) to maintain low inflation rates. 
Why countries have moved toward greater CBI is also explained by the 
work of Sargent and Wallance (1981). They suggested that if an economy is 
dominated by an autonomous monetary policy, the CBs cannot be pressured by 
the government to create money to pay their deficits and as a result the fiscal 
authorities will not have the incentive to deepen their deficits. The opposite 
would happen if the government controls the monetary policy and the deficits 
would be financed by creating money (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996). The 
dependence of the CB from the government has effects in both inflation and 
budget deficits. Moreover, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the 
European Monetary System (EMS) as safeguards of price stability, led the 
countries to search for another option that would keep the prices stable, e.g. 
greater CBI (Cukierman, 1995). The author also suggests that to be part of the 
European Monetary Union, according to the Maastricht Treaty’s criteria, a 
country should have stable prices which again can be achieved by greater CBI. 
Another potential benefit arrived from autonomous CBs is stable money 
growth and less volatility in inflation variability (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996). 
As low unemployment and low inflation are two of the main objectives, one of 
them raises and the other lowers depending of which political party is running 
the country e.g. in the USA if the Democratic party runs the state the low 
unemployment rate objective is maintained. This is achieved by monetary 
expansion and as a result the inflation rate rises and the opposite happens if 
Republicans win the elections. This implies that overall inflation variability 
may raise as a result of the government changes because their objectives change 
(Hibbs (1997); Alesina (1988); Alesina (1989). This can create inflation 
uncertainty and have negative effect on economic performance (Fischer, 1993). 
An autonomous CB will not change its objectives and policies and as a result 
the inflation variability will remain low, despite any governmental changes. 
Greater CBI in addition to inflation variability is also argued to increase 
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economic growth through economic stability and reduced risk premia in 
interest rates and which will also lower fluctuations in real output (Alesina and 
Summers, 1993). Overall, providing CBs with higher independence should lead 
to stable prices which are essential for proper planning of developments and 
investments which would not happen when politicians control the monetary 
policy (Atchariyachanvanich, 2003). So, providing the central banks with more 
independence and credibility will benefit both the economy and the 
government (Cukierman et al., 1992) 
 
2.1 Measuring Central Bank Independence 
In the last three decades, different measures of the degree of CBI have been 
proposed, however two most used indices are legal and actual indices. The 
legal measures of CBI (de jure) are proposed by Grilli, Masciandaro, and 
Tabellini in 1991 (henceforth GMT) and those proposed by Cukierman, Webb 
and Neyapti in 1992 or by Cukierman in 1992 (henceforth CWN). These are 
indices which quantify the level of CBI based on legal characteristics obtained 
from the charters of central banks (Crowe and Meade, 2007).  However, the 
most comprehensive measures of legal independence of CBs are the CWN 
indices. According to the authors, the index follows two main principles; it 
codes only the most important legal characteristics and it uses only the written 
information that can be found in the charters of CBs, indicating that the 
interpretation of CB’s law are very important. Moreover, this index comprises 
16 components classified in four main clusters of issues (Cukierman et al., 
1992): 
i. The appointment procedure of the governor of the CB. 
ii. The process of the formulation of monetary policy and the resolution of 
conflicts. 
iii. The objectives of the CB. 
iv. The limitations of lending to the public sector (e.g. government). 
Each component is coded on a continuous scale from 0 to 1, where the 
higher the value indicates greater CBI. The aggregated index is either 
calculated by using the unweighted mean “LVAU” or the weighted mean 
“LVAW”. The first method aggregates the 16 components into eight legal 
variables, by using the simple mean of variables. In the second method, by 
using weights, these eight legal variables are aggregated into one single index. 
Because both methods are highly correlated, the indices from both of methods 
are very similar. However, the weighted method is more widely used in 
practice because the authors believe that each category deserves different 
importance and as such they cannot be treated equally by providing them the 
same weight.  
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Even though the law regulates the independence of CBs, in reality it 
often happens that the CBs do not enjoy the same level of independence as it is 
provided by law. This is known as the actual or de facto independence of CB 
which represents a more realistic relationship between CBs and the 
governments than the legal CBI does. According to Cukierman et al. (1992, 
p369) the actual independence differs from legal independence because; firstly, 
the central banks laws are incomplete as it is impossible to specify all the 
characteristics of bank’s authority in the charter, secondly, if they are complete 
then actual practice may be different e.g. in Argentina the term of the governor 
is four year, but if the Minister of Finance changes then the governor also 
changes without completing the term. As such the legal independence may not 
provide the true relationship between the CB and the government, hence, 
actual indices are sometimes used. Cukierman et al. (1992) uses turnover rates 
of governors (TOR) to construct the actual indices of CBI.  These are calculated 
by dividing the number of governors changed by the number of years from the 
establishment of the CB. The larger index indicates that the CB is less 
independent as the governors are changed more often in the specified range of 
time. TOR is used more as proxy for the de facto CBI compared to 
questionnaires. In the case of transition countries, as these positions are decided 
by prime minister or the parliament then due to political turmoil that these 
economies have experienced, the TOR is high which may indicate 
governmental instability and not a direct attack to CBI (Loungani and Sheets, 
1995), so the actual indices will not be used in our empirical study due to this 
limitation. 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies 
Several empirical studies have been conducted in the subject of Central 
Bank Independence. The majority of these studies investigate the direct 
relationship between CBI and level of inflation, while for other relations these 
studies are more limited. Authors, including Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina 
(1988, 1989),  Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992), 
De Haan and Sturm (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993), Eijffinger et al. (1993, 
1994) found that more independent central banks are associated with lower 
levels of inflation. One of the limitations of these studies is that they are 
confined to the industrialized countries where legal CBI is negatively correlated 
with inflation. However, the investigations of Cukierman (1992) and 
Cukierman el al. (1992) include in their analysis also developing countries but 
found no significant relationship between legal CBI and inflation for 
developing countries. One of the main reasons for this result is that in 
developing countries the legal enforcement are weaker and as a result the legal 
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indices are not a good proxy for CBI, therefore the actual indices of CBI 
(proxied by the TOR) have been used instead. The results from Cukierman et 
al. (1992), De Haan and Kooi (2000), Sturm and De Haan (2001), Crowe and 
Meade (2007) suggest significant negative relationship between actual CBI and 
inflation for developing countries, similar as found for industrialized countries.  
On the other hand, the empirical studies regarding the effect of CBI on 
other aspects of the economy e.g. economic growth, is more limited. One of the 
main studies in this regard is that of Alesina and Summers (1993) who 
investigate the relationship between the legal CBI and real macroeconomic 
performance in industrialized countries. More specifically, the control variables 
were either the level or variability of economic growth. The authors found no 
significant relationship between the variables, indicating that higher CBI is not 
associated with higher real economic performance. Similar studies were 
conducted by De Haan and Sturm (1992), Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b), 
Eijffinger, Van Rooij, and Schaling (1996), Jordan (1998). De Haan and Kooi 
(2000) investigated the same relationship but in developing countries by using 
TOR as proxy for CBI and found no significant relationship. The same result is 
also delivered by a study from Akhand (1998) who used legal indices as proxy 
for CBI for developing countries and from the study of Alpanda and Honig 
(2009). Even if it does not have an effect on macroeconomic performance, 
greater CBI does not appear to cause costs neither. According to Grilli, 
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991, p375) “having an independent bank is almost 
like having a free lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in terms of 
macroeconomic performance”.  However, in the study of De Long and 
Summers (1992) there is a positive relationship between CBI and GDP in 
industrial countries and in the study of Cukierman et al. (1993) there is positive 
relationship for developing countries by using actual CBI.  
 In transition economies empirical studies are also limited. One of the 
pioneering studies for these economies is that of Loungani and Sheets (1997) 
who investigated the correlation between CBI and inflation in twelve transition 
countries. They conclude that a higher CBI would improve inflation 
performance only after the variable of adequate level of liberalization of 
economy is included into regression (Bogeov et al., 2011). Another study from 
Alpanda and Honig (2009) who included also emerging countries in their 
sample found no relationship between CBI and growth.  A study conducted 
more specifically for Western Balkans and other transition economies was of 
Bogeov el at 2011, who in their panel regression on 17 former communist 
countries investigated this correlation and found the same inverse relationship 
as the theory suggests, after including several macroeconomic and institutional 
variables and controlling for autocorrelation in residuals.   
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The literatures for relationship between CBI and money growth, the 
similar relationship that will be investigated in this thesis, are even more 
limited. The authors that investigate this relationship are Eijffinger, Van Rooij, 
and Schaling (1996), who for the sample of 10 industrial countries found a 
negative and significant effect of CBI on average money market rates. 
However, in this thesis the same relationship will not be investigated, instead 
the relation between CBI and money market growth (proxied by bank deposit 
growth) will be estimated. Because of the absence of literature there are no clear 
expectations.  
   
3. Methodology, Data issues, and Estimation  
Orthodox theory argues that the efficient implementation of monetary 
policy depends on the full institutional and functional independence of the 
Central Banks (Bishev, 1997, pp. 5). A potential benefit arrived from 
autonomous CBs is stable money growth and liquidity of economy which is 
best achieved by money markets. For a given level of money market 
development the hypothesis is that a more independent CB is likely to promote 
more stable growth of money supply (Dželetović et al., 2008). In developed 
economies, money markets are the most efficient way of conducting monetary 
policy while in transition countries money markets are still in their early stages 
of developments. The relationship between CBI and money market stability 
will be investigated for the Western Balkans countries and some transition 
countries. Because Western Balkans countries lack the money market data, the 
deposit growth data will be used as the proxy for the money market stability. 
The final relationship to be investigated is between CBI and bank deposit 
growth. 
 
3.1 Model Specification and Data 
The empirical study is focused on five Western Balkans countries and 
five Transition countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, and Slovakia. 
The data for 10 countries and for the period from 1999 to 2009 will provide us 
with a panel with annual data. To estimate the regression the panel data 
technique will be used.  
The regression model specification is: 
Log Deposit Growthit= β0 + β1CBIit + β2CPIit + β3GDPgrwothit + β4DIRit + 
β5NERit + β6NBBit + β7DIit + β8Year2001 + β9Year2002 + 
β10Year2003 + β11Year2004 + β12Year2005 + β13Year2006 + 
β14Year2007 + β15Year2008+ β16Year2009 + uit 
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with i= 1…n, t= 1…T and: 
- Log Deposit Growth is the log of bank deposit growths; 
- β0 is the constant parameters while β1 to β 6 are the parameters before the 
measures of the legal CBI (CBI index), inflation rate, GDP growth, 
deposit interest rate, Nominal exchange rate, Number of bank branches 
per 1,000 km2, and the dummy for deposit insurance, respectively. β 8 to 
β 16 are the parameters for year dummies from 2001 to 2009, respectively; 
- u are residuals; 
- i and t are the country and time subscripts, respectively; 
 
In this empirical model, log of bank deposit growth is taken as the 
dependent variable while the CBI indices are our main independent variable of 
interest. The negative values of bank deposit growth that can be found in our 
sample are treated as positive values because of stability. As the theory 
suggested, there is a potential effect of CBI on money growth and because of 
this a positive sign between CBI and bank deposits growth (as proxy for money 
market stability) is expected. The reason for this positive sign is that as CBs are 
more independent they will more efficiently affect the money market rates 
which then enable the banks to transform short-term monetary funds into 
investment funds which means that additional banking capital is created 
(Dželetović et al., 2008). On the other hand, more independent CBs will also 
promote more stable money markets rather than have a positive effect on it. 
Because of this we have ambiguous relationship and as literature is very 
limited regarding this relationship we do not have clear expectations. In 
collecting data for bank deposit growth the annual reports and statistics from 
each CBs in our sample have been used. Both deposits in domestic currency 
and foreign currency were taken into considered. For CBI indices two main 
techniques of calculations were used; the weighted CWN index and GMT index 
which are based on charters of CBs as presented in section 2.2.1. As actual 
practice may differ from what the law indicates regarding the mandate of the 
governor etc, the actual indices are preferred for transition countries. However, 
due to political turmoil that these economies have experienced, the governor 
has been changed very often which has made the actual indices very high3 
which may indicate governmental instability and not a direct attack to CBI, as a 
result actual indices are not an accurate proxy for CBI for the countries in our 
sample (Loungani and Sheets, 1995).  
                                               
3 The larger the actual index is, the lower is the CBI as the governors are changed more often in the 
specified range of time.  
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Because of this critique the legal indices will be used instead which have 
been calculated by Bogeov et al (2011) by using the techniques proposed by 
Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992).  
The other control variables which might have impact on deposits are; 
Inflation rate, GDP growth, Deposit interest rate, Nominal exchange rate, 
Number of bank branches, and the dummy for Deposit insurance and year 
dummies. Consumer price index is used as proxy for inflation and it affects 
deposits in two ways. Firstly, as the uncertainty increases when inflation 
increases then consumers increase their deposits to have money for 
unpredictable situations (consumers are assumed to be risk averse), secondly, if 
the consumers want to keep the same level of wealth then they have to increase 
their bank deposits as the inflation rates increase (Haron and Azmi, 2006). 
However, it is expected for the developed countries that when inflation rates 
increase the deposit interest rates decline and as such people are not willing to 
keep money as bank deposits, but because in Western Balkans there are no 
developed alternative financial intermediates (e.g. no developed capital 
markets to invest in stocks or in bonds) people in these countries use 
commercial banks to save.   
Regarding the relationship between bank deposits and growth it is more 
ambiguous, however it is postulated that “higher growth reduces current 
saving because higher anticipated future income” and so people save less 
against future earnings (Haron and Azmi, 2006, pp. 8). Even though our 
dependent variable is not savings, we provide this explanation due to the lack 
of financial intermediated in Western Balkan and where people save instead of 
investing in capital markets.  The data for inflation rate are collected from 
World Economic Outlook 2011 (IMF) while the data for GDP growth are 
collected from World Development Indicators and Global Development 
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CWN  0.79 0.39 0.98 0.15 0.00 
CBI (GMT) GMT 10.76 5.00 14.00 2.39 0.00 
Inflation 
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3.83 -11.20 10.58 3.76 0.00 
Deposit 
Interest Rates 








NBB 19.17 3.88 56.26 14.67 63.005 
Deposit 
Insurance 





0.09 0 1 0.29 0 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
On the other hand, the deposit interest rates are one of the main features 
that explain the saving behaviour of individuals and businesses (Haron and 
Azmi, 2006). According to the authors, the higher the deposit interest rates the 
more money will be deposited because people are more willing to forgo present 
consumption. For this variable the macroeconomic data from EBRD will be 
used.  The lack of alternative financial intermediates (capital markets) as 
                                               
4 This high number is the deposit growth that Serbia experienced in 2000. After the conflict of 1999 Serbia 
received a high amount of deposits. 
5 There are 63 missing observation for this variable, which is 63 out of 905 observations of the total 
sample, this low proportion may not impose a serious problem 
6 The year dummies are separated for each year and the statistics are the same for each year dummies. In 
the tables is presented only the statistics for yeadummy2001.  
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explained above, explains the reason for higher deposits in the case of increased 
deposit interest rates for Western Balkans countries and transition countries. 
The number of bank branches is also believed to increase the amount of bank 
deposits as it captured the money that people could keep in cash. By having a 
bank branch near the working place or living place may encourage people to 
keep cash as deposits in banks (Cohen and Kaufman, 1965). The bank branches 
per 1000km2 has been collected from Financial Access Survey (IMF) for 
countries in our sample but are available only from 2004, while for Croatia and 
Slovakia they are missing.  In addition, bank deposits depend also on exchange 
rates which are an important “channel in countries where households and 
firms switch readily between local currency and foreign currency deposits”, 
which is the case for Western Balkan countries (Turner, 2006, pp. 8). As 
exchange rates, the nominal exchange rates (market rates) provided by 
International Financial Statistics by the IMF will be used.  Lastly, the dummy 
for deposit insurance is also included as it is believed that this insurance 
increases depositors’ confidence which can contribute to the increase of 
deposits, other things being equal, and has the potential to make the banking 
system more stable. Deposit insurance has been adopted in many transition 
countries in 1990s and in some after 2002, according to the data from the CBs of 
each country. The year dummies from 2001 to 2009 are included to see whether 
the effects are different for different years. The year dummies for1999 has been 
excluded to avoid the dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 2006) and the year 
dummy for 2000 for each lag. The description and sources of each variable are 
summarized in the table in the end.  
 
3.2.  Estimation of the Empirical Models and Results 
The relationship between CBI and bank deposit growth is analyzed by 
employing a fixed effect panel data model (FE model) specified as: 
Log Deposit Growthit= β0 + β1CBIit + β2CPIit + β3GDPgrwothit + β4DIRit + 
β5NERit + β6NBBit + β7DIit + β8Year2001 + β9Year2002 + 
β10Year2003 + β11Year2004 + +β12Year2005 + β13Year2006 
+ β14Year2007 + β15Year2008+   +β16Year2009 + uit 
 
Before deciding to work with fixed effect panel data model, it was firstly 
compared with the random effect panel data model (RE model) and ordinary 
least square model (OLS) through different tests for each combination. It is 
suggested that the FE model is preferred. 
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As we have two measures for CBI (CWN and GMT indices), the results 
from the estimated regressions for both kinds of indices will be presented in the 
table below.  
Regression 1 uses CWN indices as the measure for CBI but does not 
include all the variables in its model (it only includes CBI, CPI, GDP Growth, 
DIR, and year dummies). This regression is specified like this as the excluded 
coefficients (NER, NBB, and DI) are jointly insignificant based on the F-test. 
Regression 2 is complete and uses CWN indices as measure for CBI. Regression 
3 has the GMT indices as the proxy for CBI and has all the variables in its 
regression. The diagnostic tests of these regressions suggest failure of the test of 
heteroskedasticity which in our sample it is expected as we are dealing with 
panel data where “the cross-sectional units may be of varying size and as a 
result may exhibit different variation” (Baltagi, 2008, pp.87). On the other hand, 
the test for serial correlation suggests no serial correlation in residuals and the 
normality test suggests normality in the residuals. As the sample has 
heteroscedasticity, the results will be interpreted with robust standard errors 
(robust S/E can adjust the problem of heteroscedasticity). 
As we can see from regression 1, the coefficient of our main variable 
CBI, has a negative sign and is statistically significant at 5% and 10% 
significance level, indicating that higher CBI has negative effect on bank 
deposit growth. Therefore this regression provides empirical support regarding 
a negative relationship between the bank deposit growth and the independence 
of Central Banks. As for the other independent variables, inflation rate as 
measured by CPI has a positive sign and is statistically significant at all 
significance levels. GDP growth is statistically not significant, indicating that it 
has no effect on bank deposit growth. In addition, the deposit interest rates 
which were expected to have significant positive effect, in this study it is 
suggested to have no empirical relationship with bank deposit growth. Year 
dummies suggest that years do not have any effect on bank deposit growth as 
they are insignificant except for the year dummy of 2008 and 2009 which 
indicate that greater CBI had positive effect in 2008 more than it did in 1999, 
and same for year 2009. The R2 of regression 1 is 52% which indicates that the 
regressors explain 52% of the variation in bank deposit growth for the sample 
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Table 2: Panel data estimation results for three regressions where Log 
Deposit Growth is the dependent variable. Sample period: 1999-2009. Results 
are presented with Robust S/E.  
 
Variables Regression 1  
(CWN indices 
as proxy for 
CBI - excluding 
B5, B6, 
and B7)   
Regression 2  
(CWN indices 
as proxy for 
CBI, with all 
variables) 
Regression 3  
(GMT indices 
as proxy for 
CBI, with all 
variables) 
^Constant 3.73*** 3.64 3.64 
^CBI -1.25** -0.20 -0.02 
^CPI 0.01*** 0.04 0.04 
^GDP Growth 0.01 0.09 0.09 
^Deposit Interest 
Rates 
0.02 0.12** 0.12** 
^Nominal Exchange 
Rates 
Excluded -0.02 -0.02 
^Number of Bank 
Branches 
Excluded -0.06 -0.06 
^Deposit Insurance Excluded Omitted Omitted 
^Year2001 0.30 Omitted Omitted 
^Year2002 -0.43 Omitted Omitted 
^Year2003 0.04 Omitted Omitted 
^Year2004 0.19 Omitted Omitted 
^Year2005 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 
^Year2006 0.15 0.19 0.19 
^Year2007 0.18 0.23 0.23 
^Year2008 -0.70* -1.10* -1.14* 
^Year2009 -1.39** -0.63 -0.63 
R2 0.52 0.33 0.34 
Observations 82 41 41 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% significance 
level.  
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When we include the other three regressors (the nominal exchange 
rates, number of bank branches per 1,000 km2, and deposit insurance) then the 
variable of our main interest (CBI) is still with negative sign but is statistically 
insignificant. Hence, regression 2 analysis suggests no empirical evidence for 
the relationship between bank deposit growth and CBI (proxied by CWN 
index). Also other variables are insignificant, apart from deposit interest rate 
which has a positive and significant effect and year 2008 which has negative 
and significant effect. The R2 of regression 2 declined even though we have 
more regressors. The reason for this is that we have fewer observations in 
regression 2 than in regression 1.  
On the other hand, regression 3 has all variables in its regression but has 
GMT indices as proxy for CBI. In this case, the results are very similar to 
regression 2, where again the coefficient of CBI has the negative sign and is 
statistically insignificant.  
Overall, this study does not provide strong empirical evidence for a 
relationship between bank deposit growth and CBI. Even though, it was 
expected that greater CBI may lead to a moderate increase of money supply, in 
this empirical study the minimum model suggested a negative effect of CBI on 
bank deposit growth but in other regressions the effect of CBI on bank deposit 
growth is not significant leading to the conclusion that the results are not 
robust and there is no clear effect.  
 
4.  Conclusion  
Previous research on the relationship between CBI and inflation is 
abundant, but because the countries in our sample have the euro as a currency 
anchor or euro as a sole legal tender, then similar research is inappropriate. On 
the other hand, since the 1990s the CBI has increased a lot in many countries 
and a potential benefit arrived from autonomous CBs is stable money growth 
and liquidity. For a given level of money market development the hypothesis is 
that a more independent CB is likely to promote more stable growth of money 
supply (Dželetović et al., 2008). The development of money markets in Western 
Balkans is still in its early stages of its development while in some other 
countries money markets are the most effective way of conducting monetary 
policy.  Because of these benefits, the relationship that was investigated in this 
thesis was between CBI and money market stability (proxied by bank deposit 
growth) for five countries of Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia) and five transition countries 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, and Slovakia).  
To investigate this relationship there were estimated three different 
regressions. The first two regressions used CWN indices as proxy for CBI.  
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The difference between them is that the first regression included only 
some of the preferred regressors (as some others were jointly insignificant 
based on F-test) while the second regression included all the regressors in its 
model. Regression 3 has GMT indices as the proxy for CBI and includes all the 
regressors in its model. Only the limited model (regression 1) suggested a 
significant negative relationship between bank deposit growth and CBI while 
the other two regressions suggested an insignificant relationship. Other models 
such as using a log-log functional form or level-level function form, or by 
including legged variables were also tried, but all these models suggested an 
insignificant relationship. Even though it was expected to have a positive and 
significant relationship as an increase in CBI may lead to increase in money 
supply and as such may have positive effect on bank deposit growth, this 
relationship was not robust and as a result we do not have a clear effect.  
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